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IN THE UTAH COURT i ,i APrbAL-S 
JOSEPH I i A (. 1' i -I WARREN, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ) 
vs. ) Case No. 960361-CA 
JOHN MELVILLE, ) 
P o m ify Ni ' I ' ' 
Defendant aiit! Appdlrr ) 
BRIEF OF APPE1 . 'NT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferrc 
provision u. VIII, §5 and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k). 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff initiated a suit for general damages arising out of injuries sustained 
in an automobile accident. The Fifth Judicial Distil* I Cum I il.i I liiiiniMhlr J,itiui\ 1 . 
SIHIIIKIU* prt'M<liii|Ji, iliMiiisM'il the action on defendant's motion for summary judgment on 
the grounds that plaintiffs claim did not satisfy the threshold requiremenis ol I Jmli i "ode 
Ann. §3JA-2 -^.>(W, ; , I" nAifi .*p,-H .ils contending that the statute denies plaintiff 
constitutionally protected remedies, equal protection, and due process of law. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Does the statutory threshold of the Utah no-fault automobile insurance law1 
violate sections 7, 11, and 24 of Article I of the Utah Constitution? This issue was clearly 
preserved in the district court (R 0041-0101). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
The texts of the following are reproduced in the addendum: Magna Carta of 
King John, 1215; Statute of Mag. Cart, cap. 29, 1297; Utah Const. Art. I, §§7, 11, and 24; 
and Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(l). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment when the automobile he 
was driving was struck broadside by an automobile driven by defendant. He was transported 
by ambulance to Dixie Regional Medical Center where he was treated and later released. 
(R 0001-0002, 0033-0036). 
As a consequence of his injuries, plaintiff lost seven days' work and underwent 
physical therapy for over four months. He incurred medical expenses in the amount of 
$2,583.56 which were paid by his employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier. The 
carrier also paid plaintiff $152.15 as compensation for his $810.51 loss in earnings. (R 0033-
0036). 
Plaintiff sued defendant for general damages. Plaintiff conceded that his 
medical expenses would not exceed $3,000. He alleged no dismemberment, disfigurement, 
or permanent disability (R 0001-0002). 
All statutory references herein are to the Utah Code Annotated. The provisions of chapter 22, Title 31A 
and chapter 12a, Title 41 will sometimes be collectively referred to as "the no-fault statutes," 
2 
Defendant moved for summary judgment contending that plaintiff could not 
maintain a cause of action because his claim did not satisfy the threshold requirements of 
section 31A-22-309(l) (R 0030-0032). The district court granted defendant's motion and 
dismissed plaintiffs complaint (R 0153-0154)o 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The right to recover damages for personal injury caused by another's 
negligence was recognized at the common law in existence when the Utah Constitution was 
framed. This and other common law remedies that were available at that time establish a 
level of "substantive protection" which must be extended to the citizens of this state against 
injuries to one's person, property, and reputation suffered as a consequence of the wrongful 
act or omission of another. 
Absent the need to eliminate a "clear economic or social evil," these rights 
cannot be abrogated unless a substantially equal substitute remedy is provided. The no-fault 
statutes provide no such remedy. Moreover, the socio-economic problems that are 
addressed by the no-fault statutes cannot be reasonably characterized as "evils." The 
abrogation of the common-law remedy for personal injury is an unreasonable means of 
attempting to achieve the goals identified in the legislation. 
Finally, the no-fault statutes violate principles of equal protection by arbitrarily 
shifting the burden of attempting to reduce automobile insurance premiums to those who 
suffer sub-threshold personal injuries. A statutory classification which abolishes some 
remedies for personal injury and preserves others is subject to "heightened scrutiny" because 
the rights involved are constitutionally protected. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH'S NO-FAULT STATUTES EXTINGUISH COMMON-LAW 
REMEDIES FOR SOME PERSONAL INJURIES. 
At common law a person has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid injuring 
other persons. See Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 673 (Utah 1984). The common law 
provides one who suffered personal injury as the result of another's negligence a remedy in 
money damages. The remedy includes compensation for pecuniary losses; pain, discomfort, 
and suffering, both physical and mental; and disruption of the ordinary affairs of life. See 
Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards, 611 P.2d 1216 (Utah 1980). 
By provision of part III, chapter 22, Title 31 A, and part III, chapter 12a, Title 
41, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, a person who has or is required to have direct 
benefit coverage under a policy of automobile liability insurance may not maintain a 
common-law cause of action for general damages for personal injury sustained in an 
automobile accident unless a statutorily defined threshold is satisfied. Section 31A-22-309(l) 
effectively extinguishes all claims for any such injuries unless one of the following occurs as 
a consequence thereof: (a) death; (b) dismemberment; (c) permanent disability or 
impairment; (d) permanent disfigurement; or (e) the individual incurs medical expenses in 
excess of $3,000. 
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POINT II 
LEGISLATIVE POWER TO ABROGATE TRADITIONAL 
REMEDIES IS SUBJECT TO LIMITATION. 
A. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
To a large extent the development of the English common law has been a 
process of identifying, and declaring the legal enforceabiUty of, rights and remedies which 
were recognized under "the custom of the realm." The common law was neither edict nor 
political mandate. It was an incident of the culture, a reflection of the "collective 
conscience," rather than a product of political dynamics within the culture.2 "Springing from 
the very nature of the people themselves, and developed in their own experience, it was 
obviously the body of laws best adapted to their needs. . . ." Cooley, Constitutional 
Limitations (6th ed.) 32. 
"Originally the purpose of general statutes was mainly to declare and reaffirm 
. . . common-law principles . . . that king and subject alike might understand and observe 
them." Id. at 33-34. Such was the purpose of "the first great statute," exacted sword in hand 
as "the confession of the king" who in that day held the legislative power: the king by 
"Divine Right" confessing our "native and original liberties" by the execution of a document 
now known as Magna Carta. See id. at 34. 
At least as early as the mid-seventeenth century, there was substantial support 
for the proposition that Magna Carta was a confirmation of the common law. See A. 
Pallister, Magna Carta, The Heritage of Liberty (Oxford 1971) 9-11. Sir Edward Coke 
^ e phrase "collective conscience" comes from Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 
(1965)(Goldberg, J., concurring), where it is used to indicate a deep-rooted public consensus regarding the 
fundamental nature of a principle or an individual right. 
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contended that in executing Magna Carta the Crown had conceded the prerogative to 
abrogate common-law principles. Other legal scholars resisted the notion that vulgar custom 
could become the measure of the power of the monarchy which was itself "the only legally 
constituted and divinely ordained authority in society." Id. at 24. Law did not exist in the 
absence of superior authority to command obedience. See id. at 24-25. 
In the parliament of 1628, Lord Coke, who had previously served as Chief 
Justice of Common Pleas and King's Bench and was then a member of the Country 
opposition, together with other members of parliament drafted a petition asking Charles I 
not to levy taxes without consent of parliament, not to imprison his subjects without due 
cause being shown, not to billet soldiers in private homes, and not to put civilians under 
martial law. This would later become known as the Petition of Right. Coke's legal premise 
was the so-called Maxim: "The Common-Law hath admeasured the King's prerogative." See 
id. at 9-10. This was nothing short of an assertion that the common law had attained 
constitutional stature. See id. at 9-11, 20-23. 
Charles granted the petition but only because he needed parliamentary 
approval of the funding of his war against Spain. Beginning in 1629, he would undertake 
a policy of personal rule. Parliament would not meet again until 1640 and civil war would 
follow almost immediately thereafter. The Petition of Right would take its place in the 
history of the EngUsh constitutional tradition and be received, like Magna Carta, with 
ambivalence which may be attributed in part to its ignominious genesis and in part to the 
fact that Magna Carta and the Petition of Right are acknowledgments of the king's 
sovereignty, representing nothing more than concessions he has made to his subjects. See 
The Federalist No. 84, p. 464 (M. Chadwick ed. 1987)(A. Hamilton). 
Some legal writers contend that Coke had suggested that Magna Carta also 
6 
placed limitations upon parliament's power to alter or abolish the common law. In 1610, 
Coke wrote his famous dictum in Dr. Bonham's Case: 
And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will 
controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly 
void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and 
reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law 
will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void. 
8 Co.Rep. 113 b, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610). Other scholars have concluded that Coke 
was actually an advocate of "parliamentary sovereignty." See Pallister at 46 n. 4 
(accompanying text). It is probably more accurate to say that Coke regarded parliament as 
the protector of the common law against royal despotism. See id. at 48. In Coke's day, the 
apparent threat to the rights of Englishmen was the ambition of the Stuarts, not parliament. 
In the late seventeenth century, Cokean stress on parliament's duty as the 
protector of the common law found an ally in John Locke. See id. at 48-49. Locke was an 
English philosopher in the natural law tradition. Under his social compact theory, 
government is a fiduciary established for the protection of "life, liberty and estate." In the 
implied compact with his government, the citizen has a reciprocal duty of loyalty so long as 
the government keeps its part of the bargain. The people extend the power to govern and 
retain the right to withdraw it. Although the differences between Locke's social compact 
and Cokean theory were fundamental, both hampered development of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty. Id. 
From the earliest colonial days, British colonists in America claimed the 
benefit and protection of the common law. In a contest with the home government, the 
ability to demonstrate that the common law conferred the rights which they claimed became 
"a source of immense moral power." See Cooley at 34-35. They wanted to be treated as 
Englishmen, to be "the inheritors of the Common Law, the Common Law as Coke and the 
7 
older jurists understood it." See J.Wu, Natural Law and Our Common Law, 23 Fordham 
L.Rev. 13, 38-39 (1954). 
The Americans would eventually throw off the government and abandon the 
monarchy and the parliamentary system, but we would keep "the best birth-right the Subject 
hath" - the common law tradition. European nobility would describe America as an asylum 
where the inmates were in charge. We, on the other hand, would conduct ourselves as 
though we had laid claim upon the inheritance of the firstborn. 
In America, "WE, THE PEOPLE" are the sovereign. We "ordain and 
establish" the constitutions by which we delegate "sovereignty" to the state and federal 
governments in such measure as we establish. See The Federalist No. 84, p. 464 (M. 
Chadwick ed. 1987)(A. Hamilton). These governments exist at the sufferance of the people, 
in whom "[a]ll political power is inherent. . . ." Utah Const. Art. I, §2. 
Under our federalist system, the federal sovereign is a government of 
"enumerated powers." It is not the prerogative of Congress to establish general property or 
tort law. See U.S. Const. Art. I, §8 and Amend. 10. Moreover, to the extent there is a 
"federal common law,"3 it does not undertake to define interpersonal rights and remedies. 
See generally, 32 Am Jur 2d, Federal Practice and Procedure §§310-319. It is state law 
which embraces the common-law principles, usages, and rules of action which in themselves 
are sufficient to the government and security of persons and property. To the extent the 
American and the English systems of government are comparable, the parallel is one existing 
between the British Parliament and the state legislature. Congress has no counterpart in the 
In the strictest sense, there is no federal common law. In the absence of congressional legislation, there 
is no body of federal law other than the Constitution. Even in those areas which fall within the "enumerated 
powers" of the federal government, the state law, common and statutory, will govern unless supplemented or 
preempted by an act of Congress. See 32 Am Jur 2d, Federal Practice and Procedure §303. 
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English system. See 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §10. 
Ironically, American constitutional law has become so "federalized" that we 
have come to think of the limitations placed upon government by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments as the measure of the power of the various state legislatures. See generally, 
Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 Temple L.Rev. 1197 (1992); Note, State Constitutional 
Remedy Provisions, 62 Wash.L.Rev. 203, 208-11 (1989); Note, The Constitutionality of 
Statutes of Repose: Federalism Reigns, 38 Vand.L.Rev. 627 (1985). The validity of state 
legislative enactments has come to be judged almost exclusively in terms of federal due 
process and federal equal protection. The Cokean doctrine of limitation upon the 
sovereign's power modify or abolish common-law rights and remedies no longer plays a 
significant part in modern American state constitutional law. Indeed, the right to "defend" 
our "rights" in the legislative process has become the swallow political legacy of a rich legal 
heritage. The tyranny of the majority - and worse, of special interest — has become the 
hallmark of our democratic republic.4 
B. 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
Federal "Substantive Due Process." What we now commonly refer to as "substantive due 
process" was the progeny (or a vestige, depending on one's point of view) of the natural law 
tradition. See 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §442. See also, Corwin, The Debt of 
While the framers of the federal constitution appreciated the fact that it was important "not only to 
guard society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of society against the injustice of the 
other part," they assumed that the fractionalization of the society under the proposed federation would 
virtually eliminate Manger from interested combinations of the majority." The Federalist No. 51, p. 283 (M. 
Chadwick ed. 1987)(J. Madison). Indeed, "popular sovereignty" can be as intolerable as any other form of 
despotism when one is a stranger to any part of the political power. 
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American Constitutional Law to Natural Law Concepts, 25 Notre Dame L.Rev. 258 (1950). 
Government, whatever its form, does not create individual rights any more than does the 
physician give life. "Rights" which are created can as easily be extinguished. Fundamental 
rights are inalienable. Neither the government nor any branch thereof can establish a law 
which impairs the free exercise of conscience, abrogates the right to acquire and control 
property, or denies any citizen the protection of his person. Such is the philosophy of the 
natural law. 
The language of the Declaration of Independence is overflowing with natural 
law and social compact concepts. However, it would soon become apparent that the 
recognition of law which is higher than the will of the popular sovereign was an impractical, 
if not impossible, undertaking in a tripartite democratic republic. Right and wrong, good 
and evil, virtue and vice are defined by our customs, traditions, religious tenets, personal 
ethics, biases, and even prejudices. Who, in our constitutional system of separated powers, 
is to be arbiter of our "collective conscience"? 
[S]ome speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act against 
natural justice must, in itself, be void; but I cannot think that, under [a 
constitutional scheme allocating powers without explicit limitations], any 
Court of Justice would possess power to declare it so. . . . [I]t has 
been the policy of all the American states, which have, individually, 
framed their state constitutions since the revolution, and of the people 
of the United States, when they framed the Federal Constitution, to 
define with precision the objects of the legislative power, and to 
restrain its exercise within marked and settled boundaries. . . . If, on 
the other hand, the Legislature of the Union, or the Legislature of any 
member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of 
their constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, 
merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of 
natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed 
standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the 
subject; and all that the Court could properly say, in such an event, 
would be, that the Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) 
had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent 
with the abstract principles of natural justice. 
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Calder v. Bull 3 Dall. 386, 398-99 (1798) (Iredell, J.)- This would be only the beginning of 
the debate in the United States Supreme Court. 
Thosewh&sought expresHimitfttionfrupon legislative authority contendedlirat 
they had found them in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
See Grant, The Natural Law Background of Due Process, 31 Col.L.Rev. 56 (1931). Lord 
Coke had drawn a parallel between the phrase "due process of law" and Magna Carta's "law 
of the land" which language, according to Coke, was an invocation of the common law 
tradition. Rg, Jensen v. Union Pac. Rv. Co., 6 Utah 253, 255-56, 21 P. 994, 995 (1889). 
Federal and state courts used the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to strike down statutes 
on federal substantive due process grounds long before federal procedural due process 
became the standard in state court criminal proceedings. 
However, federal substantive due process lost the support of the federal 
judiciary during the Great Depression. Nebbia v. New York. 291 U.S. 502, 532 (1934), 
taught us that, under the federal constitution, there was nothing "sacrosanct about the price 
one may charge for what he makes or sells." The same thing could have been said of most 
of the "rights" which we as Americans, in our shared delusion, assume to be within the 
embrace of some federal constitutional protection.5 
In Barron v. Baltimore. 7 Pet. 243 (1833), Chief Justice Marshall noted: 
The Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the 
United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for 
the government of the individual states. Each state established a 
constitution for itself, and in that constitution provided such limitations 
and restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its 
The United States Supreme Court's relatively recent revival of federal substantive due process in the 
interest of defining the "collective conscience" on issues of privacy and personal autonomy has again fueled 
the debate over this "undisciplined" doctrine of judicial review. See In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1375 (Utah 
1982). 
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judgment dictated. 
Id. at 247. And yet, when the state legislature's judgment does not comport with our own 
perception of the "collective conscience," we scour the federal constitution like disinherited 
children seeking support for the proposition that it places limitations upon the Legislature's 
prerogative to define substantive law. "We search in vain. . . ." Id. at 249. 
State Substantive "Due ProcesSo" Our state constitution was drawn as the charter of a 
sovereign possessing general police power. It is the product of an era filled with notions of 
"natural justice" and the "higher law" as well as Cokean integration of the common law into 
Magna Carta which persisted long after governmental powers were allocated by written 
constitutions. 
Less than six years before the Utah Constitution was drafted, the Utah 
Supreme Court decided Jensen v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., supra. In that case plaintiff brought 
an action against defendant railway company for the value of two horses killed on 
defendant's tracks. Although the jury made a special finding that the defendant was guilty 
of no negligence, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in accordance with 
a statute which imposed absolute liability upon a railway company for the loss of livestock 
injured or killed "by running an engine.1" 
After quoting the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the territorial 
supreme court briefly discussed the parallel Coke had drawn between the phrase, "due 
process of law," and Magna Carta's "liberty clause" which the court described as, "[f]or more 
than 600 years[,]... the sheer-anchor of the liberty of the English-speaking people." 6 Utah 
at 255, 21 P. at 995. In so doing, the court laid its premise for the following conclusion: 
When the Charter was signed by the King of England it must be borne 
in mind that there was then existing the common law of that country, 
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which prescribed regular and consistent forms and methods of judicial 
procedure for the administration of distributive justice, and it is in the 
light of this common law that the quotation is to be interpreted. 
H-^t 256, 21 P. at^95. 
The court conceded that the legislature may properly exercise the police power 
by requiring a railway company to fence its tracks and may impose penalties for failure to 
comply. See id. at 257, 21 P. at 995. Nevertheless, the court rejected the statutory 
redistribution of interpersonal rights and duties as violative of the due process clause, noting 
that in departing from the common law, the statute operated so as "to take from the 
defendant company the right of way over its track, and confer it upon the cattle and horses." 
Id. 
Jensen is actually a federal substantive due process case. Not only was it 
based on federal law, it was decided before statehood. Whatever the validity of any criticism 
of that decision, the fact remains that it was in harmony with legal thought of the era in 
which our state constitution was debated and adopted. With that constitution would come 
substantive rights of constitutional stature. However, the full significance of Article I, section 
11 of the Utah Constitution would not become apparent until long after the courts had 
abandoned federal substantive due process. 
In March 1895, the delegates to the Utah Constitutional Convention assemble 
in Salt Lake City. While the Convention is debating the necessity of including a 
constitutional provision "granting" the state the power of eminent domain and the efficacy 
of a proposed provision "authorizing" the taking of private property for certain private uses, 
Mr. Charles S. Varian addresses his fellow delegates at length. Mr. Varian lays his premise 
by authoritatively demonstrating that the power of eminent domain is an "incident of 
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sovereignty" and "requires no constitutional recognition." Official Report of Proceedings and 
Debates of the Convention: 1895 at 641-42. He then delivers an oration on the fundamental 
nature of individual property rights. 
It is possible . . . that the whole people in constitutional convention 
assembled might enact an act of confiscation, which that would be, if 
compensation was not provided; but we must also admit that it would 
be so foreign to the entire temper and disposition of the people of the 
United States, that it could not be maintained; public sentiment would 
not maintain it, and it is at least questionable at this time whether the 
courts themselves would not override the constitutional enactment, 
upon the ground that it was contrary to all natural law and an 
interference with vested rights that the present age would not permit. 
Why, the very object of this government, the primary object, is the 
protection of life, liberty, and property. Property stands upon the same 
plane with life and liberty. It is simply, as it is affirmed in the opening 
statement of this very preamble and declaration of rights, a 
reaffirmation of what has always been in this country and in England 
since the days of magna charta. . . . [A] constitution is not beginning 
of government. Government existed before the constitution. It is not 
the origin of all these rights, or privileges if you please, that are 
affirmed and declared in it and are protected in it or by it. 
Id. at 642-43. 
Sections 7 and 11, Article I of the Utah Constitution, as approved by the 
Convention and as they remain today, declare: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law. 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel any civil cause 
to which he is a party. 
The language of these sections "has come to us with the approval of the ages." 
Official Report at 305. It has its roots in the Magna Carta of King John. See Addendum. 
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The 1297 confirmation of magna carta provides the textual framework of Lord Coke's 
Second Institute in which we find the following in the gloss of chapter 29: 
Nulli negabimus, aut differemus, &c] These 
words have beene excellently expounded by latter Acts of Parliament, 
that by no meanes common right, or Common law would be disturbed, 
or delayed, no, though it be commanded under the Great seale, or 
Privie seale, order, writ, letters, message, or commandment whatsoever, 
either from the king, or any other, and that the Justices shall proceede, 
as if no such Writs, letters, order, message, or other commandment 
were come to them. 
That the Common lawes of the Realme would by no meanes be 
delayed, for the law is the surest sanctuary, that a man can take, and 
the strongest fortresse to protect the weakest of all; . . . . 
Justitiam vel rectum.] We shall not sell deny, or delay, 
Justice and right, neither the end, which is Justice, nor the meane, 
whereby we may attaine to the end, and that is the law. 
It is called Right, because it is the best birth-right the Subject hath, for 
thereby his goods, lands, wife, children, his body, life, honor, and 
estimation are protected from injury, and wrong. 
Coke, Second Institute at 56 (textual Latin deleted). 
There is no provision in the federal constitution which can be considered a 
counterpart of section 11. Many state constitutions include similar sections, but most of 
them have been treated as though they were dunnage. However, Utah's judiciary has always 
recognized the fact that section 11 has a purpose and dimension which is not fully embraced 
within the concepts of procedural due process and equal protection. 
In 1915, the Utah Supreme Court was required to construe Article I, section 
11, apparently for the first time. In Brown v. Wightman. 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366 (1915), the 
plaintiff had been shot and maliciously wounded by an assailant who immediately thereafter 
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turned the weapon on himself. The district court dismissed plaintiffs action against the 
estate because at common law the cause of action abated upon the death of the tort-feasor. 
While recognizing that rule was a harsh one, the court held that section 11 did not mandate 
any remedy which was not available at common law. 
The courts have, however, always considered and treated those 
provisions, not as creating new rights, or as giving new remedies where 
none otherwise are given, but as placing a limitation upon the 
Legislature to prevent that branch of the state government from closing 
the doors of the courts against any person who has a legal right which 
is enforceable in accordance with some known remedy. 
Id. at 34. 
On the same day Brown v. Wightman was decided, the supreme court also 
handed down Lewis v. Pingree Nat'l Bank, 47 Utah 35, 151 P. 558 (1915), which, without 
citing a specific section, included the following dictum: "Under our Constitution, a right of 
action exists for any injury or damage to private property, and neither the Legislature nor 
the municipalities can interfere with that right. . . ." Id. at 53. 
In 1968, Congress authorized the department of transportation to conduct a 
survey of the constitutionality, under the various state constitutions, of a no-fault automobile 
insurance plan which had been proposed by the American Insurance Association. Part of 
that survey appears as a note entitled "No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah - State 
Constitutional Issues," published at 1970 Utah L.Rev. 248. 
The Note discusses numerous sections of the state constitution at length. 
When the author turns his attention to Article I, section 11, he states: "On its face, this 
constitutional clause would appear to invalidate the AIA plan because the plan denies an 
injured party a right of action for pain and suffering " Id. at 266. Then citing Brown v. 
Wightman, supra, as authority, the Note concludes: "If a cause of action does not exist at 
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law for pain and suffering,... this section of the Utah constitution neither creates a cause 
of action for such injuries nor prevents a bar to suit in these situations." Id. After less than 
one page of discussion, the author dismisses section 11 as any constitutional impediment to 
the AIA plan, concluding that the Legislature could effectively abrogate any legal remedy 
for personal injuries which have not already been suffered. 
Once an injury is suffered as the result of another's wrong, the injured party 
possesses a chose in action — a property right which cannot be arbitrarily extinguished. In 
substance and effect, the author of the Note suggests that the right to legal protection of 
one's person can be extinguished until such time as that right is converted into a property 
interest, which apparently enjoys greater stature than does the right to the protection of 
one's person. The Utah No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act was enacted in 1973 and 
became effective January 1, 1974. 
In 1984, section 11 was applied in striking down a statute which had purported 
to abolish a common-law cause of action. In Malan v. Lewis, supra, the Utah Supreme 
Court held the Utah Automobile Guest Statute unconstitutional as a denial of equal 
protection in violation of Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution. Section ll 's role in 
the analysis was that of giving constitutional stature to the rights which had been abrogated 
by the guest statute and thereby to heighten the level of judicial scrutiny applied under a 
state equal protection analysis. Malan v. Lewis is discussed further under "State Equal 
Protection," infra. 
In Berry v. Beech Aircraft. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme 
Court, in reviewing the constitutionality of Utah's product liability statute of repose, finally 
gave Article I, section 11 "its due." The court concluded that 
the framers of the Constitution intended that an individual could not 
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be arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to protect basic 
individual rights. A constitutional guarantee of access to the 
courthouse was not intended by the founders as an empty gesture; 
individuals are also entitled to a remedy by "due course of law" for 
injuries to "person, property, or reputation." 
Id- at 675. 
Berry went on to say that the open courts provision is not primarily concerned 
with the preservation of particular remedies but rather with "the availability of legal 
remedies for vindicating the great interest that individuals in a civilized society have in the 
integrity of their persons, property, and reputations." Id. at 677 n. 4. Although section 11 
does not "freeze" the law governing private rights and remedies as of the time of statehood, 
the common-law rights and remedies of that era provide "at least a measure of the kinds of 
legal rights" the framers had in mind for the protection of one's person, property, and 
reputation. See id. at 676 n. 3. Section 11 is more than a philosophical statement. See id, 
at 676, It is a state constitutional mandate embracing an identifiable body of fundamental 
law. 
Berry gave us a two-part analysis. First, legislation that abolishes a cause of 
action, which has traditionally provided vindication of the individual's interest in the integrity 
of his "person, property, or reputation," will survive judicial scrutiny under section 11 "if 
there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of an existing 
legal right is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective." Id. at 680. 
Plaintiff would characterize the socio-economic conditions which would legitimize this type 
of legislative action as "great conflagrations and calamities."6 
Consider the following insight from the Utah Constitutional Convention which, although presented by 
way of debate on a property rights issue, provides a valid allegory of the principles underlying the "clear social 
or economic evil" part of the Berry analysis. 
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Second, a traditional cause or remedy can be abolished even if there is no 
necessity of addressing "a clear social or economic evil," provided the legislation establishes 
an effective and reasonable substitute remedy. See id. 
The benefit provided by the substitute must be substantially equal in 
value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated in providing essentially 
comparable substantive protection to one's person, property, or 
reputation, although the form of the substitute remedy be different. 
Id. 
Plaintiff would characterize legislation of this nature as "political tinkering." 
It gives society the flexibility, even where traditional rights and remedies are involved, to 
repair, adjust, or experiment with our system of distributive justice based upon nothing more 
than political considerations. The legislative decision to abolish a traditional remedy need 
not be justified or even rationalized so long as the legislation provides a substitute remedy 
"substantially equal in value or other benefit." 
In substance and effect, the open courts provision establishes a minimum level 
of "substantive protection" which the law of this state, absent "great conflagrations and 
calamities," must extend to the individual for the vindication of injury to his person, property, 
and reputation. This standard is established by reference to the common law remedies 
It is impossible for any American citizen to admit for a moment that the power lies 
anywhere in a legislative body or in the people themselves to invade the ownership 
of private property to the extent that it may be taken, even for public use, without 
compensation; and of course that principle is always accompanied with another, that 
in cases of supreme necessity, when the laws are silent, when the necessities of the 
entire community require different action, it is not applicable then. As an instance 
it may be illustrated in cases of great conflagrations and calamities of that kind, 
which have overtaken and may be expected to overtake large communities; when a 
great fire eats away and destroys cities, the government may step in on such 
occasions and may arrest the progress of the flames, or attempt to do so, by 
destroying private property, for the benefit of the public, and unless there is a statute 
providing for it, no man is liable and no compensation need be made. But, we are 
not dealing with exceptional cases, we are dealing with the general principles.... 
Official Report at 642 (by Mr. Varian). 
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which were recognized when the Utah Constitution was framed. 
Berry places Utah among those states which hold that the open courts clauses 
give common-law rights and remedies constitutional stature. See generally. Note, Medical 
Malpractice Statute of Repose: An Unconstitutional Denial of Access to the Courts, 63 
Neb. L.Rev. 150, 170-78 (1983). Like Berry, decisions from these jurisdictions indicate that 
the protection provided does not require recognition of particular remedies. But, unlike our 
supreme court, the courts in some of these jurisdictions have held that the constitutional 
mandate is satisfied by the provision of a "reasonable substitute." See Gentile v. Altermatt, 
169 Conn. 267, 363 A.2d 1 (1976); Laskv v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974). 
Other courts indicate that the substitute remedy must provide "adequate quid pro quo." See 
e.g., Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982). Moreover, some 
opinions declare that the quid pro quo analysis includes the benefit of prompt recovery 
under one's own policy and the potential benefit of one's own tort immunity. See Gentile, 
363 A.2d at 15; Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 15. 
Berry makes it clear that the Utah Supreme Court's choice of the language 
describing the substitute remedy as "substantially equal in value or other benefit" was made 
advisedly, purposefully, and with a great sense of the obligation of seeing that this 
constitutional mandate is implemented. Reviewing the approaches which other states having 
similar open courts provisions had developed, the supreme court made the following 
observations: 
In our view, the cases holding products liability statutes of repose 
constitutional under state open courts or remedies provisions have all 
but read these constitutional provisions out of their respective 
constitutions, at least as far as they provide substantive, as opposed to 
procedural, protections. . . . [Some courts have] relied on the general 
principle that one of the functions of the legislative power is "to 
remedy defects in the common law as they developed, and to adapt to 
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the change of time and circumstance"... [and have] also relied heavily 
on the usual deference that courts accord legislative enactments by way 
of a presumption of constitutionality We are simply not at liberty 
to eviscerate a mandatory provision of our Declaration of Rights by 
limiting our analysis to those principles alone. That kind of analysis 
would result in the legislative power prevailing in every case, and would 
deprive the constitutional rights embraced in section 11 of any 
meaningful content or force. If we are free to refuse to give substance 
and meaning to section 11 because it stands in tension with the power 
of the Legislature to adjust conflicting interests and values in society, 
we could as well masculate every provision of the Declaration of Rights 
by the same method of analysis. We decline to do that. 
1717 P.2d at 678-79. 
Section 11 is a common-law legacy of constitutional dimension. The judiciary 
has an important role in seeing that the substantive rights afforded by the common law are 
not lost to short-sighted political considerations or the pressure of special interests. 
Condemarin, 775 P.2d 348, 366-69 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in part). 
In In re J.P.. 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court formulated 
an Article I, sections 7 and 25 approach to judicial scrutiny which avoided a Roe-v-Wade-
style revival of federal substantive due process. 
Unlike substantive due process cases like Roe v. Wade, which rely on 
a "right of privacy" not mentioned in the Constitution to establish other 
rights unknown at common law, the parental liberty right at issue in 
this case is fundamental to the existence of the institution of the family, 
which is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," and in 
the "history and culture of Western civilization." This rooting in history 
and the common law validates and limits the due process protection 
afforded parental rights in contrast to substantive due process 
innovations undisciplined by any but abstract formulae. 
648 P.2d at 1375 (emphasis added, citations omitted). Clearly, the Utah Supreme Court did 
not want In re J.P. to be seen as signaling a return to the glory days of substantive due 
process. 
Later, when Berry characterized section 11 as an extension of the due process 
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2clause, 717 P.2d at 679, the supreme court took great care to demonstrate that the 
"substantive protection" provided by the Article I, sections 7 and 11 approach is disciplined 
by common-law principles which in themselves are sufficient to the government and security 
of persons and property. 
C 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
Federal Equal Protection. The Fourteenth Amendment is a mandate which the federal 
constitution impress upon the individual states. Ratified in 1868, it was designed to rid the 
individual states of the vestiges of black slavery. Its breadth has not been extended much 
through its application. 
A statute which creates a "suspect" classification or affects a "fundamental" 
right will be subject to judicial review under a "strict scrutiny" standard and will survive only 
if the classification is shown to advance a "compelling state interest." See Harper v. Bd. of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). If the classification is 
not "suspect" and does not involve a "fundamental" right, judicial review will usually be made 
under a "rational basis" standard and the statutory classification will survive "if any state of 
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 
(1961) (emphasis added). 
As a practical matter, judicial review under the "rational basis" standard 
provides no review at all. See Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 358 (Durham, J., lead opinion); id-
at 367 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in part). Where constitutionally protected rights are 
involved, review on such a superficial level is no more acceptable to a conscientious judiciary 
than is the judicial intrusion into the realm of legislative power which was once accomplished 
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in the name of federal substantive due process. 
State Equal Protection. Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution states: "All laws of 
a general nature shall have uniform operation." This is Utah's equal protection mandate. 
In Malan v. Lewis, supra, the Utah Automobile Guest Statute was held 
unconstitutional under section 24. The statute had been upheld just ten years earlier in 
Cannon v. Oviatt 520 P.2d 883 (1974). The critical difference between Malan and Cannon 
was the level of the judicial scrutiny applied. Malan, 693 P.2d at 668 n. 12. The Malan 
court was unwilling to apply a "reasonable [rational] basis" standard in reviewing legislation 
which impaired rights entitled to protection under section 11. See id. at 674 n. 17. The 
guest statute had been on the books for 50 years. 
Before Malan, the Utah Supreme Court had not made any real distinction 
between federal equal protection and state equal protection. Malan did not identify the 
level of judicial scrutiny to be applied. The opinion simply stated that there was "no reason 
to adopt either the federal strict scrutiny test or the so-called intermediate or heightened 
scrutiny test."7 Malan did not outline a section 24 analysis as Berry would later do for 
section 11. The opinion had effectively demonstrated that the statute was "so shot-through 
with exceptions as to be incapable of reasonably furthering the statutory objectives." 693 
P.2d at 672. 
The need of further refining the Utah equal protection analysis applicable in 
cases involving section 11 rights became apparent in Condemarin v. University Hospital 
supra. That case was decided by a "holding" which represented the consensus, and indeed 
One commentator has noted: "Precisely because these classification schemes use federal terminology 
such as 'fundamental rights' and 'levels of scrutiny,' each is a Procrustean bed into which remedy jurisprudence 
cannot be forced without distortion." See Schuman at 1204. 
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the only consensus, of three justices who based their conclusions on different grounds. 
Justices Durham, Zimmerman, and Stewart wrote separate opinions each of which, to some 
extent evidenced frustration in attempting to provide legitimate judicial oversight of the 
legislative process. See 775 P.2d al 369 (Stewart, J.)(substantive due process analysis 
illegitimate); id. at 358-60 (Durham, J.); id at 367 (Zimmerman, J.)(federal equal protection 
analysis inadequate). 
Finally, in Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993), the supreme court 
reached a consensus on an equal protection analysis which was sensitive to the "due process" 
protections guaranteed by sections 7 and 11. 
[A] statutory classification that discriminates against a person's 
constitutionally protected right to a remedy for personal injury under 
Article I, section 11 is constitutional only if it (1) is reasonable, (2) has 
more than a speculative tendency to further the legislative objective 
and, in fact, actually and substantially furthers a valid legislative 
purpose, and (3) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate 
legislative goal. 
Id. at 582-83 (citations omitted). 
POINT III 
THE NO-FAULT STATUTES DO NOT PROVIDE A 
"SUBSTANTIALLY EQUAL" SUBSTITUTE REMEDY. 
In the event the court should determine that the no-fault statutes provide a 
substitute remedy which is "substantially equal in value or other benefit" to the remedy which 
is abrogated thereby, the legislation will not be subject to further review on a "due process" 
level. Moreover, such a determination would apparently destroy any basis for applying 
"heightened scrutiny" under a state equal protection analysis because the persons within the 
class would enjoy substantive protection substantially equal to that enjoyed by those who do 
not fall within the statutory classification. The statutory classification established by the no-
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fault threshold would still be subject to review but only under a "rational basis" standard 
which it would almost certainly survive. 
Availability of Substitute Remedy. When the Utah segment of the department of 
transportation survey was published in 1970, the author of the Utah Law Review note did 
not take the position that the AIA no-fault plan provided an adequate substitute remedy. 
He simply concluded that 
the AIA plan would not be required by the Utah due process clause to 
provide an adequate substitute remedy for those remedies eliminated 
by the plan or to make sure that any substitute remedy, which is 
provided for a previously existing remedy, is reasonable and just. 
1970 Utah L.Rev. at 263. Moreover, the author acknowledged the disparity between the 
insurance benefits and the common-law remedy in the following comment: 
The most serious equal protection problem will arise when, because of 
the increased cost of living, the fixed statutory recoveries become 
grossly disproportionate to those recoveries possible in tort in that they 
fail to compensate the average injured party for his actual losses. 
Id. at 255 (emphasis added). 
In Berry, supra, the Utah Supreme Court briefly mentions the Utah no-fault 
statutes as an example of legislation which provides a substitute remedy "for certain kinds 
of damages caused by personal injuries sustained in automobile accidents," noting that the 
act "provides an insurance remedy for special damages in lieu of a common law remedy." 
717 P.2d at 677. Cf. Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 383 n. 54 (Hall, C.J., dissenting). 
Conspicuously absent is any mention of a substitute remedy for "general damages." 
Section 41-12a-301 impresses an obligation upon everyone who registers an 
automobile in this state to maintain financial security. This is typically provided by 
purchasing a policy of automobile liability insurance that includes direct benefit, personal 
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injury protection (PIP) coverage. Any injured person for whom PIP coverage is provided, 
from whatever source, or who is legally required to have such coverage cannot maintain a 
cause of action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been 
caused by an automobile accident. See §31A-22-309(l). 
Section 31A-22-307 outlines the mandatory PIP benefits which include medical 
expenses up to $3000, lost earnings up to $250 per week for up to 52 weeks, etc. These PIP 
benefits are paid to any covered person who is injured in an automobile accident without 
regard to fault because the right is based upon contract rather than tort principles. 
Accordingly, this part of an injured person's pecuniary losses can be paid without awaiting 
determination of liability or apportionment of fault. 
Section 31A-22-308 outlines the distribution of the PEP coverage. Under 
subsections (1) and (2), the insured and members of his "household" are provided PEP 
coverage against injuries arising out of an automobile accident which incurs anywhere in the 
United States or Canada involving virtually any motor vehicle. From the prospective of the 
insured, this PEP coverage operates like a small policy of health and disability insurance. 
Unlike subsections (1) and (2), which extend PIP coverage to a small group 
of identified individuals against injury from the motoring public, subsection (3) describes the 
beneficiaries of the coverage in terms which identify particular individuals at the instant they 
are injured. From the prospective of the insured, this coverage operates like liability 
insurance. If the insured has been exposed to potential liability as a result of an accident, 
involving the insured's automobile wherein any person has been injured (1) while occupying 
his automobile, or (2) while not occupying any motor vehicle, the insured is given at least 
partial "tort immunity" under §31A-22-309(l) because PIP benefits are instantaneously 
extended to such persons and they therefore have no cause of action for general damages 
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arising out of a sub-threshold injury. If the claim meets the threshold, the insured's liability 
is at least reduced by the PIP benefits which have been paid to that party. 
If all persons owning a registered motor vehicle complied with the law, PIP 
coverage or some equivalent would be extended to virtually anyone and everyone who is 
injured in an automobile accident. Section 31A-22-308 provides secondary coverages which 
extend PIP benefits to those who might otherwise be uninsured as the result of someone 
else's failure to maintain mandatory insurance. The most significant category of persons who 
are left with no PIP coverage is the non-owner passenger of an uninsured motor vehicle who 
has no secondary coverage as a member of the household of an insured motorist. Persons 
within this category have the right to sue for general damages without reference to the 
statutory threshold. The owner of an uninsured vehicle is personally liable for the payments 
of the benefits provided under §31A-22-307. 
As between PIP insurers, the distribution of the obligation to make direct 
payment of PIP benefits is made by statutory directives which have been established without 
reference to fault. See §31A-22-3G9(3) and -309(4). Indeed, if fault were any part of the 
formula, the "immediate" payment of the direct benefits would have to abide the 
determination of liability and the apportionment of fault because the "primary coverage" PIP 
insurer would be identified in the process. 
The no-fault statutes do not provide a substitute for either the "general 
damages" remedy abolished by §31A-22-309(l) or the "special damages" remedy eliminated 
by the combined operation of §§31A-22-309(6) and 41-12a-304. PIP benefits are no remedy 
at all. 
PIP coverage is mandatory health and disability insurance which provides 
protection for the entire public against a specific risk and is paid for by those persons who 
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contribute to the creation and extension of that risk by owning a registered automobile. It 
is purchased with money, not by the exchange of one's common-law right. The coverage 
that replaces the common-law remedy is purchased as much by the persons who have lost 
the common-law remedy as by those who have acquired "tort immunity".8 The costs of the 
no-fault system are distributed among the population as thoroughly as a state-imposed tax 
and the PIP benefits are as available to every qualifying person as are the benefits of any 
government service or "entitlement." Indeed, the social nature of this legislation is brought 
clearly into focus by the provisions of §31A-22-309(3) which reduces one's PIP benefits by 
the amount that party recovers under any workers' compensation or similar plan. 
If such insurance indeed provides a "substitute remedy" for the purposes of the 
Berry analysis, the Legislature can constitutionally provide remedies for every legally 
cognizable injury to one's person, property, and reputation by merely requiring all "citizens" 
to purchase insurance against all such losses. One's "rights" would no longer be inherent in 
his membership in "the collective," he would purchase protection with the insurance 
premiums he would pay. The common law, which created an entire system of "principles, 
usages, and rights of action applicable to the government and security of persons and 
property," could be replaced with nothing but money and carefully drawn insurance 
contracts. 
A system which purports to remedy wrongs where there is no wrong 
underestimates the social value of personal accountability. Every citizen "must expect to be 
held to the reasonable person standard of due care." Malan, 693 P.2d at 673. Cf. 
o 
Consider Professor Keeton's observations concerning what he would consider to be the desirable demise 
of any remaining vestiges of the fault-based compensation system as insurers establish practices and procedures 
for the "wholesale" adjustment of claims for reimbursement. See Robert E. Keeton, Compensation Systems 
and Utah's No-Fault Statute. 1973 Utah L.Rev. 383, 392-93. 
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Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 364-65. (Durham, J., lead opinion) (discussing "deterrent" aspects 
of fault-based compensation systems). Moreover, in some cases the availability of a forum 
for public expression of one's anger, outrage, or grief is as important an aspect of a civil 
proceeding as is the recovery of monetary compensation. 
Adequacy of Substitute Remedy. The proponents of no-fault legislation have never touted 
it as providing a substitute remedy for general damages. However, if the no-fault statutes 
are to be sustained because they provide a "substantially equal" remedy, the PIP benefits will 
have to include a substitute remedy for general as well as special damages, otherwise the 
minimum standard of "substantive protection" will be compromised. Berry, 717 P.2d at 680. 
"General damages" is a "comprehensive term for elements of tort damages 
other than economic losses." See Keeton, supra, note 16, at 392. Such damages include 
those losses which "necessarily flow from the legal injury." See generally, McCormick on 
Damages (1935) 32-36. Such damages are the sum and substance of a cause of action for 
injury to one's person. Indeed, these damages have traditionally made up the lion's share 
of the personal injury claim. See generally, Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards, supra. 
A "remedy" which provides only partial reimbursement of one's pecuniary losses and no 
compensation for his general damages does not provide "substantive protection" comparable 
to that provided by the common law. 
The American Insurance Association's attempt to compare no-fault automobile 
insurance and workers' compensation legislation is clearly flawed. See Note, 1970 Utah 
L.Rev. at 252-53. Workers' compensation legislation completely replaced the common-law 
system of "distributive justice." It has never been suggested that the workers' compensation 
benefits are or must be "substantially equal in value or other benefit" to the common-law 
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remedies. Workers' compensation legislation eliminated a universally recognized social and 
economic evil and was enacted in the interest of improving the welfare of the worker for 
whom relief at common law had proved to be inadequate, if not non-existent, and in the 
interest of !laccess[ing] the costs of injury and disease against the industry." Masich v. United 
States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 125, 191 P.2d 612, 624 (1948). The 
only valid comparison between workers' compensation and no-fault legislation lies in the fact 
that they are both social legislation. 
POINT IV 
THE NO-FAULT STATUTES WILL NOT SURVIVE JUDICIAL 
SCRUTINY. 
When the Utah No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act became law in January 
1974, former section 31-41-2 (which has no comparable provision in chapter 22, Title 31 A) 
identified the social and economic "evils" which were targeted by the legislation. 
The intention of the legislature is hereby to possibly stabilize, if not 
effectuate certain savings in, the raising costs of automobile accident 
insurance and to effectuate a more efficient, equitable method of 
handling the greater bulk of the personal injury claims that arise out 
of automobile accidents, these being those not involving great amounts 
of damages. 
Law of Utah 1973, ch. 53, §2. 
Although the Legislature did not make any specific findings, some are arguably 
implicit in the above-quoted statement of legislative purpose. They are most liberally 
expressed in the following terms: (1) Automobile liability insurance rates are rising. (2) The 
cost of such insurance must at least be stabilized. (3) The existing system of compensation 
is inefficient. (4) The present method of handling claims in cases involving smaller amounts 
of damages is not cost-effective. 
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Having demonstrated that the right to a remedy for injury to one's person is 
protected under Article I, section 11 and that the no-fault statutes extinguish some of these 
common-law lights without providing a substantially equal substitute remedy, we now 
examine the legislation under the Lee v. Gaufin analysis and the second part of the Berry 
v. Beech Aircraft analysis. These two approaches significantly overlap one another. The 
following paragraph provides a visual comparison of the Utah due process and equal 
protection analyses and outlines the argument that will follow. 
STATEJ DUE PROCESS 1 ANALYSIS 
{EQUAL PROTECTION J 
1. Does the legislation eliminate "a clear social or economic evil"? 
? T (elimination of existing right an arbitrary or unreasonable 1 f (achieving 1 , ? 
[creation of classification a reasonably necessary J [furthering) 
3. Does classification actually and substantially further a valid purpose? 
4. Is the statutory classification itself unreasonable? 
STATE DUE PROCESS 
THE BERRY V. BEECH AIRCRAFT ANALYSIS 
Even where the Legislature has made findings supporting its action, the court 
will draw its own conclusions about the validity of the Legislature's assessment of social and 
economic conditions when the legislation has a substantive impact on constitutionally 
protected rights. See Lee, 867 P.2d at 580; Berry, 717 P.2d at 681-83. See also, 
Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 363 (Durham, J., lead opinion)("citizens are entitled to a showing 
in the courts"); id. at 368 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in part)(burden upon proponents of 
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legislation's validity where constitutionally protected rights of opponent are involved); 
Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter. 785 P.2d 1087, 1096 (Utah 1989)(Zimmerman, J., 
concurring). See generally. Note, Utah's Emerging Constitutional Weapon - The Open 
Courts Provisions: Condemarin v. University Hospital 1990 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 1107, 1116-18. 
No matter how much deference is given the Legislature's "findings," the stated 
legislative purposes do not demonstrate the existence of "a clear social or economic evil." 
This is not because the proponents of the legislation were unaware of the need to present 
a strong case for reform. See Note, 1970 Utah L.Rev. at 252-53. The evidence simply did 
not exist. Indeed, some proponents of no-fault insurance apparently conceded that there 
was no automobile liability insurance "crisis" in 1970, arguing only that the legislation was 
necessary in order to avert one. See id. 
"A crisis can be a truly marvelous mechanism for the withdrawal or suspension 
of established rights, and the acquisition and legitimation of new privileges." Condemarin, 
775 P.2d at 362 (Durham, J., lead opinion)(quoting other sources). The "crisis rationale" is 
based upon a premise that the legal system does not work any more: if we are going to 
preserve our standard of living we have to realign our respective legal rights and obligations. 
In the context of liability insurance reform, the tactic is implemented by blaming the 
impending crisis on the established system of tort law. See id. at 362-63. Anyone who 
opposes reform must be discredited. Those who question the legitimacy of the "solutions" 
proposed by the insurance industry are motivated by greed rather than intellectual honesty, 
even if they are members of the insurance defense bar.9 
9Note, 1970 Utah L.Rev. at 253 n. 33 (suggesting that the Defense Research Institute's criticism of AIA's 
efforts to compare no-fault legislation with workers' compensation was motivated by a desire to avoid being 
"deprive[d]M of "considerable legal fees"). 
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The creation of the perception of impending crisis does not require the 
availability of relevant and material evidence. Sometimes the most compelling "evidence" 
is that which is designed to play to the gallery. In the political arena, one outrageous 
anecdote can be more effective than volumes of empirical data. As an example, when the 
statute of limitations for habeas petitions was shortened to three months, the proponents of 
the legislation relied on anecdotal "evidence" relating to highly publicized murder cases in 
which habeas petitions had repeatedly delayed the prisoner's execution. See Currier v. 
Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1366-67 (Utah App. 1993). In holding the three-month limitations 
period unconstitutional, the court of appeals noted: 
Considering that the State presented no empirical or factual data to 
the effect that prior to enacting this statute, non-death row inmates' 
petitions created a problem, much less a "clear social evil," the overly 
broad impact of this statute is particularly disturbing. 
Id. at 1367. 
In the context of political debate, reference to an 18-year delay in the 
execution of a death sentence may have been very effective although it was completely 
immaterial to the issue of the reasonableness of establishing a three-month limitations 
period. One hot cup of McDonald's coffee can become conclusive evidence of a failed 
system of tort law. And the beauty of it all is that, on this level, one is never forced to deal 
with the merits of any particular cause, including those we use to make our point. 
Let us now consider the legislative purposes identified in the original Utah No-
Fault Automobile Insurance Act. 
Expedite Payment of Certain Pecuniary Losses. The direct benefit coverage provisions of 
the no-fault statutes do expedite the payment of compensation for some economic losses. 
The inconvenience and, in some case, hardship that were associated with delaying all 
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compensation pending the resolution of all disputed issues arguably warranted legislative 
concern and action. However, these problems could not reasonably be characterized as 
clear socio-economic evils against which the Legislature could sacrifice traditional legal rights 
and remedies. Legislative solutions were not "urgently and overwhelmingly necessary."10 
Moreover, the no-fault statutes needlessly abolish the common-law remedy. The 
unnecessary elimination of a constitutionally protected right is an unreasonable means of 
achieving any legislative goal. 
The same socio-economic benefit has been achieved in add-on insurance 
jurisdictions without abolishing any traditional remedy. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Xvie, 606 P.2d 
1197, 1199, 1201-02 (Utah 1980). This is not to say that add-on insurance has no critics. 
Indeed, proponents of no-fault insurance have identified a fundamental flaw in a system 
which puts money in the injured party's hands without extinguishing his common-law 
remedies. See O'Connell, No-Fault Automobile Insurance: Back by Popular (Market) 
Demand? 26 San Diego L.Rev. 993 (1989). 
Under the pure tort system, victims are often without funds to cover 
accruing medical expenses, lost wages, and other losses while their case 
is battled. So claimants often settle for relatively little rather than 
undergo the delay and uncertainty of final resolution of a tort claim. 
But, with a tort system bolstered by no-fault benefits (along with 
growing coverage for health care costs by private insurance as well as 
medicare and medicaid), victims are guaranteed resources which enable 
them to energetically pursue a tort claim (after hiring a lawyer at no 
initial cost on contingent basis). This leads to even higher costs for the 
tort claims that are left under no-fault laws. 
Id. at 995. Apparently, some consider expediting the payment of compensation a socio-
economic evil if traditional remedies are not eliminated. Injured persons may not be forced 
to settle for "relatively little," forcing automobile insurance premiums even higher. 
10This phrase is from Justice Durham's due process analysis in Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 363. 
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Lower the Cost of Automobile Liability Insurance. The Legislature suggested that the 
enactment of the no-fault statutes would "possibly" advance the public interest by lowering 
or at least stabilizing the cost of automobile insurance. Clearly, this is not an "evil" such as 
will justify the abrogation of anyone's common-law right to compensation for personal injury. 
Berry is a "balancing analysis." Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 358 (Durham, J., lead 
opinion). When the benefits" to the public as compared "to the denial of rights protected 
by article I, section 11" strike an acceptable balance, the constitutionality of the legislation 
may be sustained. See id. However, Vhen the disability they seek to impose on individual 
rights is too great to be justified by the benefits accomplished or when the legislation is 
simply an arbitrary and impermissible shifting of collective burdens to individual citizens," 
id., the legislation will not survive judicial scrutiny. See also, Horton v. Goldminer's 
Daughter, 785 P.2d at 1096 (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
Workers' compensation legislation is an example of balancing public benefit 
against individual detriment. See Masichu 113 Utah at 125, 191 P.2d at 624. It is doubtful 
that a constitutionally protected right could ever be balanced off against anything less than 
a true socio-economic evil: an actual crisis. Even if no-fault legislation had achieved this 
stated goal, the goal is not worthy of the loss of any personal right which could be 
considered constitutional in its dimension. 
"Effectuate a More Efficient, Equitable Method." Notwithstanding the lip service which 
former §31-41-2 paid to the need to "effectuate a more efficient, equitable method of 
handling the greater bulk of the personal injury claims that arise out of automobile 
accidents," the eUmination of general damages claims in sub-threshold cases was not based 
upon a determination that the common-law remedy has proven to be inadequate. The "evil" 
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which the no-fault statutes address is the constitutional right itself - the right to "have 
remedy by due course of law" in the courts of this state - or at least the perception that this 
right is being abused. See Jepson v. State, Dept. of Corrections, 846 P.2d 485, 488 (Utah 
App, 1993)(quoting Carter v. Cross, 373 So.2d 81, 83 (Fla. App. 1979), for the proposition 
that no-fault legislation has been "prompted in part by a desire to reduce [automobile 
accident] litigation" which observation was made in the context of a discussion of "compelling 
institutional need[s] in this day and age of congested court calendars"). Cf. Note, 1970 Utah 
L.Rev. at 261 (to the same effect). 
Currier v. Holden, supra, involved the constitutionality of a statute which 
established an extraordinarily short period of limitations for filing petitions seeking post-
conviction relief. Although prisoners had at least three months within which to file their 
petitions and notwithstanding the fact that the state was able to articulate six legitimate 
public interests which were promoted by establishing a short limitations period, 862 P.2d at 
1366, the statute was held unconstitutional under Article I, section 11. This provision of the 
constitution declares the public policy of the state of Utah as it relates to the individual's 
right to access the judicial system. The Legislature cannot override that policy. See 
generally, 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §245. 
Without question, the advent and increased availability of liability insurance, 
together with the public's awareness thereof, has substantially increased the average jury 
verdict and, consequently, the settlement value of personal injury claims. The insurance 
industry would have the public and the Legislature believe that this "feeding frenzy" 
demonstrates that our system of tort law does not work anymore. See generally, Evans v. 
Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 466-67 (Utah App. 1991)(discussing the insurance industry's "tort 
reform" campaign and "propaganda" which is "designed to influence the public concerning 
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the 'evils' of large jury awards"). 
Our friends and neighbors !tknowlf that personal injury lawsuits have nothing 
to do with justice and everything to do with greed. Even we, as members of the Bar and 
Bench, while recognizing that distributive justice mandates the availability of adequate legal 
remedies for injuries to one's person, have begun to embrace the idea that ready access to 
legal remedies has become part of a larger problem rather than a right worthy of protection. 
Accordingly, we begin to accept the idea that judicial resources can be allocated on the basis 
of the political appeal of certain types of causes and the political repugnance of others, 
without regard to the merits of the individual claim. 
Both the Legislature and the courts enjoy significant roles in defining what it 
means to be a citizen of this society. Concededly, those roles are quite different. When the 
supreme court has been asked to consider the continuing viability of certain common-law 
remedies, it has refused to abolish any traditional cause (including causes which do not 
provide vindication for injury to one's "person, property, or reputation11) simply because some 
litigants may abuse the common-law right of actions. 
First, the very purpose of courts is to separate the just from the unjust 
causes; second, if the courts are to be closed against actions for . . . 
alienation of affections on the ground that some suits may be brought 
in bad faith, the same reason would close the door against litigants in 
all kinds of suits, for in every kind of litigation, some suits are brought 
in bad faith; the very purpose of courts is to defeat unjust prosecutions 
and to secure the rights of parties in just prosecutions. . . . 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1216 (Utah 1983)(quoting Wilder v. Reno, 43 F.Supp. 
727, 729 (D.Pa. 1942)). 
Even if the judicial system were on the verge of collapse, it would only be an 
indication of the inadequacy of the judicial resources, not the effectiveness of the existing 
legal remedies. The Legislature cannot, in the interest of minimizing the "evil" of citizen-
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initiated litigation, extinguish the right to prosecute claims which are based upon a viable 
legal theory because the claims are arguably "less significant" than other claims based on the 
same legal theory. Nor can the Legislature distribute "scarce" judicial resources on the basis 
of purely political considerations and, in so doing, silence also in the courts those whose 
voices are never heard in the Legislature. 
[T]he basic purpose of Article I, section 11 is to impose some 
limitation on that power for the benefit of those persons who are 
injured in their persons, property, or reputation since they are generally 
isolated in society, belong to no identifiable group, and rarely are able 
to rally the political process to their aid. 
Berry, 717 P.2d. at 676. Cf. Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 367 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in 
part)(perfunctory judicial review inadequate protection against special interest legislation). 
B. 
STATE EQUAL PROTECTION 
THE LEE V. GAUFIN ANALYSIS 
We previously discussed the "due process" issues which relate to the stated goal 
of lowering the cost of automobile liability insurance. See Point IV-A, supra. We will now 
discuss an issue which, while having "due process" overtones, has been most clearly 
articulated in the Lee v. Gaufin equal protection analysis: "[A] statutory classification that 
discriminates against a person's constitutionally protected right to a remedy for personal 
injury . . . is constitutional only if i t . . . actually and substantially furthers a valid legislative 
purpose " 867 P.2d at 582-83. 
Furthering a Valid Legislative Purpose. Plaintiff had assumed that any available empirical 
data would indicate that the no-fault insurance scheme was "actually and substantially" 
reducing the cost of automobile insurance. However, government and industry surveys 
38 
indicate that the no-fault statutes have not reduced the cost of automobile liability insurance 
at all. 
In 1985, the United States Department of Transportation reported that 
between 1976 and 1983, automobile insurance premiums rose 50% in those states that have 
not enacted no-fault legislation and rose an average of 54% to 126% in no-fault states, 
depending on the type of no-fault statute in force. See USDOT, "Compensating Auto 
Accident Victims," May 1985, at 4. The "pure premium" cost of a package of no-fault 
insurance in Utah for the year 1987 was 3.4% higher than the estimated "pure premium" 
cost of a comparable policy of standard automobile liability insurance in this state for the 
same year. See Brian A. Smith, Reexamining the Cost Benefit of No-Fault, Chartered 
Prop. & Casualty Underwriters J., March 1989, at 28. 
Defendant suggests that the USDOT report demonstrates that no-fault 
insurance is achieving the objectives for which it was implemented. Although premiums are 
higher, insurance benefits paid out are an average of 79% greater in no-fault jurisdictions 
than they are in traditional liability jurisdictions. This is not an unexpected result when one 
considers the fact that no-fault insurance operates like health, disability, and liability 
insurance. All injured parties receive insurance benefits. This includes tort-feasors, guests 
of insured motorists (without regard to fault), etc. Plaintiff does not contend that the no-
fault statues have not been effective as social legislation. Whether or not this legislation has 
been effective on this level, it has not "actually and substantially furthered]" the stated 
objective of lowering or stabilizing the cost of automobile liability insurance. 
The constitutionality of the no-fault statutes cannot be salvaged by simply 
revising the articulated legislative goals to conform with those things which the legislation 
has actually achieved. In order to state such an objective, the Legislature would have to 
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acknowledge that no-fault insurance does not reduce the cost of automobile liability 
insurance. While it achieves worthwhile social goals, it does so by increasing the cost of such 
insurance. In actuality it socializes the field of sub-threshold personal injury claims. It 
substitutes the concept of commutative justice for the common-law concept of distributive 
justice and, in so doing, champions equality over merit, uniformity over individualism, and 
resolution over accountability. 
If no constitutionally protected rights were involved, this would be a political 
decision. Because such rights are at stake, the decision is political only if the legislation is 
a reasonable response to an existing to a socio-economic evil or provides a substantially 
equal substitute remedy. 
Reasonable Classification — Formulation. Any classification based upon numerical 
succession is, in the strictest sense, arbitrary. Plaintiff concedes that this does not necessarily 
render such a classification "unreasonable" for equal protection purposes. As an example, 
any classification based upon age is to some extent arbitrary. No matter where the line is 
drawn to designate the legal distinction, there is, as a practical matter, little difference 
between who an individual is the day before he turns 21 and who is he is the following day. 
Even if the state does not have a legitimate interest in prohibiting a 50-year-old from 
drinking alcoholic beverages, it does have an interest in prohibiting a 5-year-old. The line 
must be drawn somewhere. However, it does not follow that the line can be drawn 
anywhere. 
Although plaintiff has never seen this argument advanced in support of the 
validity of the no-fault statutes, there is, in personal injury litigation, as in any other 
endeavor, a point at which the undertaking is no longer cost-effective. Some may argue that 
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the no-fault threshold draws a reasonable line based upon the cost-benefit ratio in the 
smaller vis-a-vis larger damages claims. One would think the market would make these 
adjustments, and indeed it does. Regardless of the latitude the Legislature may enjoy in the 
area of economic regulation, we are here concerned with regulating constitutionally 
protected rights out of existence. Even if a cost-effectiveness analysis somehow justifies state 
interference with these rights, let us consider how the Legislature established this watershed 
between personal injury cases. 
When the no-fault insurance act became law in January 1974, the PIP medical 
benefits were $2,000 and the medical-expense threshold was $500. See Laws of Utah 1973, 
ch. 53, §§6, 7. Effective July 1, 1986, the PIP medical benefit increased from $2,000 to 
$3,000 and the medical-expense threshold increased from $500 to $3,000 making it the 
highest such threshold in the United States with the exceptions of Hawaii and Minnesota.11 
If we were to assume that this 50% increase in PIP medical coverage was 
attributable to inflation12 over the twelve years intervening the enactment of the statute 
and its amendment, no explanation has been advanced to justify the 500% increase in the 
medical-expense threshold. 
The medical-expense threshold established in 1973 was supposed to be an 
attempt to establish a reasonable watershed between the "less significant11 and the other 
During the regular session in 1985, Senate Bill No. 232 recodified the entire insurance code, effective 
July 1, 1986. The bill was 789 pages in length. That bill renumbered and re-enacted the no-fault provisions 
and increased the PIP medical benefits to $3,000 and the medical-expenses threshold to $1,000. See Laws of 
Utah 1985, ch. 242, §27. During the 1986 legislative session and before the effective date of the above-
mentioned recodification, Senate Bill No. 91 was enacted making amendments throughout the recodified 
insurance code. This bill was 574 pages in length. This bill raised the medical-expense threshold to $3,000. 
See Laws of Utah 1986, ch. 204, §164. 
12 
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review and Handbook of Labor 
Statistics, periodic, the cost of medical care, on a national level, increased 188% between 1974 and 1986. 
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personal injury claims. Its validity was purportedly based on the premise that the threshold 
criteria were a reasonable, although imperfect, reflection of the severity of the personal 
injuries suffered. See Keeton, supra, at 384. If we assume the validity of this premise, the 
Legislature's recodification of the insurance code in 1985 and 1986 included fairly subtle 
amendments which have the potential of substantially increasing the number of claims barred 
and including within that augmented class claims involving injuries of four times the 
magnitude of the most serious injuries which fell below the threshold in 1974.13 This, as 
far as plaintiff can determine, occurred without any legislative debate or even discussion. 
Having embarked upon this road, the Legislature apparently assumes that it 
can now arbitrarily set the threshold at any level without regard to the uniform operation 
mandate of Article I, section 24, 
Reasonable Classification — Operation. Finally, even if the level of the medical-expense 
threshold has been carefully selected based upon some valid criteria, the threshold is still 
arbitrary in its application and operation. And the legislative goal of establishing an 
"equitable method" of handling smaller injury claims has not been achieved. 
Arbitrary Inclusion in Class. The difference between having a common-law 
cause of action and having no cause at all may be a function of nothing more than the 
distance from the site of the accident to the hospital if the injured party is transported by 
ambulance. It may be attributed to the cost of diagnostic measures which actually establish 
the absence of a suspected injury. 
Even if we use the actual national inflation figures and the same assumption regarding the 
proportionality of personal injury to medical expenses, the 1986 amendment abolished the common-law rights 
of action in cases involving personal injuries which were nearly twice the severity of the gravest injuries 
excluded by the threshold in 1974. 
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The determination of whether or not one's common-law tort remedy has been 
extinguished has little or no relationship to the extent of his overall economic losses or the 
extent to which such losses are not covered by PEP benefits. 
Arbitrary Exclusion from Prosecuting Claim in Pending Litigation. If driver 
A does not satisfy the threshold, A cannot maintain a cause of action even by way of 
counterclaim in a suit filed by driver B, regardless of the merits of their respective claims. 
The validity of B's claim is determined in a proceeding wherein the fact and extent of A's 
injuries are immaterial. If C, A's passenger, sues A and B, A cannot sue B although A's and 
B's proportionate fault will be fully litigated in C's lawsuit. 
Incongruence with Other Rules of Law. In Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 
(Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court held that the father of an 8-year-old boy who 
witnessed his son's accidental death had a tort claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. The boy was struck by an automobile as he and his father stood on the sidewalk 
waiting for a traffic light to change. The father was in the "zone of danger." 
One of the defendant's argued that the plaintiff father could not maintain a 
suit for general damages because he had not satisfied the no-fault threshold of §31A-22-
309(1). See Br. of Newspaper Agency Corporation at 39-43 (docket no. 20622). See also. 
Reply Br. at 15-17. Plaintiff had a cause of action for his son's wrongful death and PIP 
coverage for any physical injury which he may have suffered. The emotional distress claim 
apparently represented general damages only. The supreme court's decision contains not 
so much as an allusion to the no-fault statutes. 
As far as counsel is aware, this is the only time a Utah appellate court has 
been asked to dismiss a claim based upon a failure to satisfy the no-fault threshold. Rather 
than doing so, the court unanimously agreed that Utah law now recognizes a "new11 
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negligence cause of action. And this, at the height of the most recent "tort reform11 
movement. See 763 P.2d at 783-84 (Durham, J., lead opinion). 
In 1981, Utah enacted a dramshop law. It creates statutory causes of action 
for personal injury and property damage resulting from the intoxication of (for the sake of 
simplification) tavern patrons. See §§32A-14-101 et seg. The tavern owner's liability is 
derived from the liability of the intoxicated patron to this extent: a claimant suffers injuries 
"resulting from the intoxication" only if (and, apparently to the extent) the intoxicated 
patron's negligence exceeds that of the claimant. See Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 
1991). Once liability is established on that level, the tavern owner's liability is strict. 
Most dramshop claims apparently arise in the context of an automobile 
accident. However, the dramshop act contains no threshold similar to the no-fault statutes. 
Although a person whose claim does not satisfy the no-fault threshold does not have a 
common-law cause of action against an intoxicated patron who injures them, he now 
arguably has a new statutory cause of action against a tavern owner created by the more 
recent legislation. 
Plaintiff submits that even if the statute were somehow to survive scrutiny on 
every other level, it is apparent that the formulation of the classification was arbitrary and 
that the classification is unreasonable in its operation, 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff concludes with the following observations which include some insights 
of Dean Roscoe Pound and which summarize the concerns which plaintiff would express. 
Perhaps the most important and difficult problem of jurisprudence is 
how to strike the golden mean between individual interests and social 
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interest, how to transcend both individualism and collectivism. . . . 
Dean Pound . . . recently uttered a warning. . . . "May we not have 
faith that [the common-law] tradition will have continued strength to 
resist the effects of economic unification of the world and losing sight 
of the individual in the general bigness of things, and the tendency of 
the service State to become omnicompetent and totalitarian, and so to 
secure to the English-speaking world the liberty which it has always 
claimed as its birthright.11 But in order to keep the Common-Law 
tradition, we have, as a first step, to pass through a spiritual 
renaissance and go back to the great tradition of Coke, of St. Thomas 
More, and of Bracton. Finally, we must have a clear grasp of the 
Scholastic idea of the common good, which lay at the basis of the 
Common Law from its very beginning. 
The common good does not mean merely the collective good of the 
State. It includes that, but above all it embraces all the personal goods 
common to men as men. In order to minister to these goods, the law 
must recognize and protect the fundamental rights of the person. . . . 
J. Wu at 45-46. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Utah no-fault statutes are 
unconstitutional as violative of sections 7, 11, and 24, of Article I, of the Utah Constitution, 
and that the judgment of the district court must be reversed. 
DATED this J day August, 1996. 
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ADDENDUM 
Magna Carta of King John, 1215. 
[39] No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or 
in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, 
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. 
[40] To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay right or 
justice. 
McKechnie, Magna Carta: A Commentary on the Great Charter of King John (2d ed. 1914) 
375, 395. 
Statute of Mag. Cart, cap. 29, 1297. 
No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his 
Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or 
any otherwise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn him, 
but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land. (2) 
We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either 
Justice or Right. 
Statutes at Large, ed. O. Ruffhead, revised. C. Runnington (1786-1800), i. MO. 
Utah Const. Art I, Section 7. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
Utah Const. Art. I, Section 11. 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause 
to which he is a party. 
Utah Const. Art I, Section 24. 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 31A-22-309(l). 
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage 
under a policy which includes personal injury protection may not 
maintain a cause of action for general damages arising out of personal 
injuries alleged to have been caused by an automobile accident, except 
where the person has sustained one or more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon 
objective findings; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
